A Dash Of Thought

Predictability and Free-Will

Suppose there is a man, John, who holds a terrible fear of spiders.Whenever presented with a spider, John’s outward behavior always adopts a stance of fear. Based on this would we conclude that John lacks freedom in his arachnid interactions? No, ordinarily we would contend that John may be free to react differently, perhaps to display calculated indifference or hatred instead, but is constrained by himself, i.e. his fear of spiders, to react accordingly. Thus all of John’s interactions with spiders are subsumed under a law-like statement:

s1 - If presented with a spider, John will react with fear

Assuming that we know John will never overcome his extreme arachnophobia, this law-like statement will allow us to predict John’s behavior in arachnid interactions with complete accuracy. That we can successfully predict John’s behavior in arachnid-involving situations does not seem to deter us from asserting John’s freedom in those situations. You might claim that John’s arachnophobia is somehow distinct from John, thus it is a force “external” from him in some sense that imposes in a deterministic fashion upon his will. But this could similarly be done for just about any mental phenomena, even preferences that are normally taken to be expressions of free-will. This attempt at distinguishing only works so long as you leave what precisely is John or John’s will undefined. So far as you provide a definite reference for what constitutes John or John’s will, such attempts will either fail or not account for all phenomena that are taken as expressions of John or his will. Now, suppose there is an omniscient entity that knows everything about John. This entity could extrapolate the following law-like statement about any of John’s behaviors:

s2 - If under conditions C, John will X

No matter how unique or nuanced a situation, the entity need only expand the variables and counterfactuals accounted for in C to make a corresponding law-like statement that enjoys complete accuracy. This entity’s omniscience implies it would be able to use these law-like statements to predict all of John’s actions before he actually does them, making the entity’s claims about John actual predictions instead of retrospective historical facts. The complete predictability of John’s actions via law-like statements in no way suggests John is not capable of freedom in those situations. This in turn suggests that complete or universal predictability through law-like statements does not disprove free-will. Instead, complete predictability is quite besides the point of free-will, so to speak.

Probability and Explanation

One of the fundamental drives of the scientist is to find explanations for the things around him. If one accepts probability as ultimate, he has, by the very definition of probability, given up the possibility of explanation. I would concede that one has a perfect right not to give up the possibility og explanation except in the very last resort, and to follow as long as he can a program of theorizing that envisages the ultimate possibility of finding some sort of “explanation”.

Percy W. Bridgman, excerpt from Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science

But does it really? A popular view in statistical theory established by Hempel maintains that high-probability events are explained via subsumption under probabilistic laws, high-probability laws serving as an “approximation to a deduction”. (Nozick, Philosophical Explanations) Let us avoid the paradox of the heap and ignore where precisely “high” lay for the purposes of this discussion. For subsumed low-probability events Hempel’s view is initially unhelpful and offers no explanation as to how low-probability laws might explain low-probability events. But as Nozick points out, for all practical purposes we consider the probabilistic laws deduced from the frequency of low-probability events to be explanations of those events, just as we do for high-probability events. So we must explain how this intuition about low-probability events is justified. I think this can be done with a little logical acrobatics. Suppose there is a given phenomenon P with a .9 probability of obtaining leaving Not-P, our low-probability event, with a .1 probability of obtaining. If both these probabilities are known with great confidence, then for any sizable set of P and Not-P observations the probability of both P and Not-P events obtaining in their known corresponding frequencies approaches 1. Thus both the low-probability and high-probability set of observations are transitively explained under another high-probability event, the probability of P and Not-P obtaining in specific frequencies. The P and Not-P set of observations are subsumed under this high-probability event, thus both sets of observations are explained via the corresponding probabilistic law which, due to its high-probability, approximates to a deduction. This explains a set of observed P and Not-P.

Hume and Continuity in Human Preference

… . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov’d by death, and cou’d I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou’d be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic’d reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu’d, which he calls himself; tho’ I am certain there is no such principle in me.

           David Hume,A Treatise of Human Nature

The above provides a concise statement of Hume’s Bundle Theory as applied to the issue of personal identity. Hume denies ontological status to anything aside from properties. A deeper substance in which they inhere, such as a soul, thus being rendered out of the question. While I agree with the idea of opposition to the loaded concept of a soul, I do not think Hume’s reflection justifies the view of personal identity as composed only of the observed properties bound together to form an individual. His reflection occupies a descriptive, not explanatory, context. Within the descriptive context I have nothing against his reflection — my experience is no different from his. However, in broadening discourse to an explanatory context his reflection proves lacking.

The Humean bundle of perceptions does not explain the apparent continuity in human preferences or what we might call the continuity in human will. Here I admit using the term continuity with vagueness — I mean it to refer to the tendency for preferences to demonstrate a peculiar sort of consistency across time. Barring the concept of time, I think this idea might be expressed as the connectedness of the actions of one individual, they proceed from one another with some sort of binding relation amongst them. Assuming human behavior can be explained, then there must be some appropriate explanatory variable that can be identified.

In the Humean bundle the available variables, i.e. perceptions, are not sufficient. While our perceptions affect our preferences they do not explain all of them. Our perceptions as experienced emerge secondary, after coloring by our preferences. While at times we may link preferences to past perceptions, i.e. our conscious histories, in all individuals there are undoubtedly preferences that cannot be linked to some determinate element of perception. It is these preferences which present a roadblock to Hume’s conception of personal identity - the reality of these preferences emerges implicitly in human action and it’s continuity, but themselves are not explained by this emergence. If we accept that our preferences demonstrate continuity, and do not simply come upon us in a completely random manner, this phenomenon’s mechanisms needs to be identified; these identified mechanisms would then also constitute the explanatory variables for the continuity in human will.

Notes on Singular Identity, pt. 1

So far as we recognize ourselves as individuals, we recognize ourselves as one individual. That is to say, the tokens “I”, “you”, “my”, etc. all refer to a singular entity. This we assume a priori in virtue of the apparent unity of consciousness that we experience. Thus this assumption undergirds most discussions of self, identity, and other similar constructions while also bleeding into ontologies attempting to describe such phenomena. If we take this assumption seriously, then the following proposition should always hold: Conscious experience never engages with identity or a component thereof as the Other. If it is possible for conscious experience to perform this act, then the unity of conscious experience cannot be taken as evidence of singular identity. The performance of such an act would suggest, in spite of the unity of conscious experience, disunity in identity. If identity is singular, then it most demonstrate some sort of unity beyond the behavioral, that is, if we also assume identity is more than the mere behavioral.

That being said, consider the concept of ‘self-control’. If we assume identity is singular, then this concept should never have arisen. In an act of ‘self-control’ conscious experience engages with elements of identity, perhaps impulses, motivations, or desires. Ordinarily this would be no great difficulty. However, in the case of ‘self-control’ conscious experience engages with these elements as beyond consciousness – elements distinct from consciousness to be conquered or conquered by. In any other words, these elements are the Other from the perspective of conscious experience. If there is a dynamic of Self (in this context, conscious experience) and Other within the individual – within the identity, then how is it that identity can remain singular?

Testing for Human Indeterminism

When we call something indeterminate we basically mean that given conditions C, there is a set of multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes from which a single event can obtain. This label is evidenced by observing multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes obtaining at varying frequencies given multiple trials involving conditions C. On a practical level, this method of obtaining evidence severely complicates attempts to connect the concept of free-will with the physical phenomenon of indeterminism. The edict of Heraclitus – “Ever-newer waters flow on those who step into the same rivers” – reminds us that any attempt to test whether human behavior is indeterminate will ultimately fail. While it may be possible to control for all relevant physical conditions outside of the individual, the psychological variables of the agent engaging in the purportedly free action cannot be controlled for. This deficiency is fatal – what we seek to test is intricately tied with the psychological conditions of an individual. Without control over both sets of conditions, a true-experiment to determine whether or not humans behave indeterminately is not possible.

Perhaps I am guilty of confusion in concepts. The psychological variables of a free agent can be seen as mechanisms for an event obtaining instead of as the necessary conditions under which an event obtains. If a phenomenon in question is indeterminate, there is no reason why we might assign only one mechanism for each obtainable event. Indeed we might even expect there to be multiple mechanisms for any one obtainable event. Either way, for a true-experiment there is a need to control for conditions, not mechanisms. With this conceptual (or semantic?) sidestep one avoids the need to control for psychological variables in a test of human indeterminism.

But there is an intractable difficulty that this sidestep does nothing for. For past decisions, it is always posited that a free agent could have done otherwise. But honestly, given the same conditions, would we ever expect the free agent to actually do otherwise? Suppose there is a man, John, who has just awoken from a coma. He is immediately offered the choice of either an apple or an orange. Upon choosing the apple (because oranges are fucking messy), John immediately falls back into a coma and awakens several seconds later with no recollection of the previous transaction. He is then offered the same choice again, and suffers the same fate regardless of his decision. In movies and TV-shows characters reliving the same experiences and conditions while stuck in a “time loop” are often depicted making choices differing from their original ones – but these alternative choices only obtain given that the free agent is aware of relevant retrospective knowledge, i.e. is aware that they are reliving the same events. This retrospective knowledge represents a change in conditions. In this case, there is no change in conditions, as John retains no retrospective knowledge. So for any of these trials, assuming conditions remain unchanged, would we ever realistically expect John to select the orange? I think not, yet this situation is a paradigm example of a perfect true-experiment for human indeterminism. This leaves us in a strange situation – true-experiments for human indeterminism will likely result in evidence opposing human indeterminism, while pseudo-experiments (characterized by “time-loop” individuals with retrospective knowledge) will likely result in evidence supporting human indeterminism.

Chemically-induced Action and Crime

Suppose an individual is injected with a certain chemical substance without their consent that results in increased levels of aggression, panic, strength, and impaired judgement, among other things. This individual then commits a violent crime, mostly likely facilitated by the chemical, and is subsequently incapacitated. Most people would agree that this individual is not wholly responsible for their actions, therefore the mandated punishment must be reduced. The presence of a behavior-affecting chemical makes it problematic to establish mens rea, i.e. wrongful intent. This could very easily be the difference between manslaughter and murder, or a felony and a misdemeanor.

Now, consider the fact that there is such a chemical substance that afflicts individuals rather frequently—adrenaline. Suppose an individual receives a stimuli that provokes an adrenaline rush, some sort of fight-or-flight response, and during that response commits a violent crime. I’d be willing to bet that most people, without appeal to the exigent circumstances surrounding the stimuli, would not be willing to declare our adrenaline-addled individual free of mens rea, i.e. said individual is still assumed responsible for their actions. Perhaps this is due to public perception of adrenaline; the substance is too familiar and common to be regarded as a legitimate exigent circumstance in the same way as alcohol or cocaine. Or perhaps all cases involving adrenaline impairment are considered adequately covered by appeals to other exigent circumstances, e.g. self-defense. The latter reason is especially problematic.

First, it would mean we accept as an exigent circumstance impairment caused by a voluntarily consumed substance, e.g. alcohol and other drugs, while not accepting as an exigent circumstance impairment caused by an involuntarily consumed substance, such as adrenaline. Between the two options, I’d think impairment due to involuntary consumption has a greater claim to an absent mens rea than impairment brought on by voluntary consumption.

Second, assuming all adrenaline impairment cases are covered by other legitimate exigent circumstances basically punishes some offending individuals for their physiology—something quite out of their control. While other legitimate exigent circumstances may in fact be present in most cases involving adrenaline impairment, there will still yet be some small number of cases involving adrenaline impairment without a corresponding legitimate exigent circumstance. It is the individuals of these cases who will unduly suffer from such a policy. The lack of a legitimate exigent circumstance doesn’t change the fact that an individual may have been suffering from adrenaline impairment regardless. Seeing as the adrenaline intake is involuntary, one should not be expected to have an exigent circumstance to legitimize said intake once the fact of it’s occurrence is established—the intake itself is the circumstance. Otherwise, we are punishing individual’s not for actus rea and mens rea but instead for a biologically induced, involuntary actus rea.

But this discussion is largely academic. While other impairing substances usually leave a relatively long-lasting trace in the body, adrenaline does not. There would be no way to actually verify claims of adrenaline impairment, rendering the claims next to useless in court. If there was such a method, it would probably have a drastic effect on charging in violent crime cases, especially domestic violence ones.

Altruistic v. Ego-centric Morality, Part 2.

Part 1:

Distinguishing between altruistic and ego-centric ethical systems may be useful for the purposes of categorization and comparison. This distinction can be achieved by utilizing the twin-concepts of the Self and the Other while observing the flow of responsibility promoted by an ethical system.

Symmetrical systems maintain that the Self holds ethical obligations to the Other and that the Other holds ethical obligations to the Self. The common-sense view of ethics probably conforms closely with a symmetrical system. Martin Buber’s work serves as a highly-developed example of such a system. On the other hand, asymmetrical systems maintain either that (a) the Self holds ethical obligations to the Other, or that (b) the Other holds ethical obligations to the Self. A prominent though mystified example of this would be Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical philosophy.

We can call asymmetrical ethical systems of type (a) altruistic, while assigning the ego-centric label to symmetrical and type (b) asymmetrical systems. Altruism is commonly understood as self-less behavior. This can be equated to behavior without the expectation of reciprocity. Type (a) asymmetry guarantees that the moral agent factors in only concerns for the Other, i.e. their moral obligations to the Other, while ignoring self-centered considerations, such as the Other’s consequent obligations to the Self, or the Other’s behavior towards the Self. To factor in such considerations as required by a symmetrical or type (b) asymmetrical system introduces an element of reciprocity, rendering the given system ego-centric.

Connecting this discussion back to events people actually care about, a society’s choice of either an altruistic or ego-centric ethical system can severely affect said society’s corresponding criminal justice system. Ego-centric systems tend toward retributive justice. This tendency is fostered by the symmetry of ethical obligations. The Other undergoing punishment for wrongs to the Self is seen as part of the Other’s ethical obligations towards the Self, just as the Self’s ethical obligations to the Other renders the Self liable for punishment from the Other. From the standpoint of a symmetrical system this justifies the whole enterprise of punishment.

Altruistic systems tend toward rehabilitative justice alongside a heavy emphasis on procedural justice. The idea of retribution doesn’t feature prominently in an altruistic system because to require an Other to undergo punishment only on the basis of wrongs to the Self implies that said punishment is part of the Other’s ethical obligation to the Self. However, rehabilitative justice comes in play to fill the void left by retributive justice. Here to inflict a “punishment” upon an Other is not because the Other has an ethical obligation to undergo said punishment, but because the Self has an ethical obligation to help the Other. Within rehabilitative justice, the intended function of the punishment must be to help the Other in a manner consistent with the Self’s obligations towards the Other. Thus the Self must inflict a particular kind of punishment upon the Other given a wrong because such is their ethical obligation to the Other, but the Other is not ethically bound to undergo said punishment.

Altruistic v. Ego-centric Morality, Part 1.

Distinguishing between altruistic and ego-centric ethical systems may be useful for the purposes of categorization and comparison. This distinction can be achieved by utilizing the twin-concepts of the Self and the Other while observing the flow of responsibility promoted by an ethical system.

Symmetrical systems maintain that the Self holds ethical obligations to the Other and that the Other holds ethical obligations to the Self. The common-sense view of ethics probably conforms closely with a symmetrical system. Martin Buber’s work serves as a highly-developed example of such a system. On the other hand, asymmetrical systems maintain either that (a) the Self holds ethical obligations to the Other, or that (b) the Other holds ethical obligations to the Self. A prominent though mystified example of this would be Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical philosophy.

We can call asymmetrical ethical systems of type (a) altruistic, while assigning the ego-centric label to symmetrical and type (b) asymmetrical systems. Altruism is commonly understood as self-less behavior. This can be equated to behavior without the expectation of reciprocity. Type (a) asymmetry guarantees that the moral agent factors in only concerns for the Other, i.e. their moral obligations to the Other, while ignoring self-centered considerations, such as the Other’s consequent obligations to the Self, or the Other’s behavior towards the Self. To factor in such considerations as required by a symmetrical or type (b) asymmetrical system introduces an element of reciprocity, rendering the given system ego-centric.

The Lesser Evil Principle and Politics

The lesser evil principle maintains that given a set of otherwise unacceptable options, the least unacceptable option is to be selected. This phrasing is misleading, however. In practice, onefirst determines the least appealing options, and chooses to avoid them. While this may be an efficient method to resolve difficult moral conundrums, it has undesirable political consequences.

Foremost in my mind, this principle promotes a political practice that is at best dishonest and at worst dysfunctional towards representative democracy. Here it is important to note a distinction between voting for a candidate/policy and voting against a candidate/policy. The former mechanism expresses support for a candidate or policy. This is the intended function of voting. The latter mechanism expresses disapproval of a candidate or policy, but does not clearly establish what an individual actually supports. Thus voting against produces equivocal results, the likes of which can easily be abused by the politically savvy. This leads to the selection of candidates or policies that correspond only with what the public unequivocally does not desire. This would be acceptable if we dealt with binary policy considerations, but such is simply not the case. A negation in this context is just not substantive enough to suggest the appropriate affirmation. With this distinction in mind, I think it obvious that the habitual product of the lesser evil principle is voting against. One cannot accept the opposing candidate or policies, prompting one to support whatever other option is available. The focus here is negation, not affirmation.